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1. Executive Summary
In 2017, terrorist attacks in Europe, the United States as well as in other parts of the world have 
continued. Mostly inspired by ISIL – the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant – these attacks 
indicate that this organisation retains the intent and capability to cause further harm. 
As we argued in the GLOBSEC Intelligence Reform Initiative’s (GIRI) last report, Reforming Transatlantic 
Counter-Terrorism, the recent terrorist attacks have revealed major seams in some nations’ law 
enforcement and intelligence capacities and capabilities, and highlighted failures in both domestic 
and transnational counter-terrorism (CT) cooperation. Many of the failings identified occurred due 
to problems with standardisation, legislation, and organisational trust. Our last report proposed four 
solutions to improve transatlantic CT cooperation and national capabilities: the establishment of a 
permanent Core Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Hub; operational Case-Based Task Forces; and a 
“hit no-hit” single search interface between existing databases. Our final recommendation was to 
create a transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Centre of Excellence to accelerate tactical and operational 
standardisation. 
This feasibility report takes up the mantle of the CT CoE to explore the benefits of such a new body. 
The ultimate aim of the CT CoE would be to assist European and transatlantic partners in increasing 
their capacity, interoperability and trust. First, it would do so by creating a secure space to build 
and consolidate transnational and inter-agency relationships amongst mid-level CT professionals. 
Second, the CT CoE would provide a comprehensive practical training program for mid-level CT 
intelligence, security and law enforcement professionals from willing and capable states. This training 
would seek to contribute to standardisation in respect to terminology, threat assessment, protection 
of information and privacy as well as key tradecraft skills within the CT domain. The CT CoE would be 
a platform where best practices are exchanged, syllabuses and training material shared, and relevant 
courses introduced.
Based on our research, we propose that an already existing, respected CT institution should sponsor 
the CoE; that a respected framework nation provides the political will and expertise to ensure its 
success; that individual courses rotate through other respected nations; and that the courses become 
accredited by academic institutions. In doing so, the credibility of the CoE will be assured while the 
CoE itself can act as a gatekeeper for any CT Hub.
Intelligence cooperation is characterised by a high degree of informality and driven by personal 
relationships. The proposed CT CoE is not an attempt to change this informal culture. Furthermore, 
we acknowledge that it is neither possible nor desirable to dictate the standards of the intelligence, 
security and law enforcement profession to partner countries. Nevertheless, as discrepancies between 
states do exist, it is important to understand them and to create a voluntary platform for exchanging 
and potentially adopting practices from different intelligence and security cultures that best address 
the current terrorist threat.
If intelligence agencies do not continuously innovate and adapt to meet the increasingly transnational, 
criminal and technologically-savvy terrorists of today, the attacks of the past three years will continue. 
Moreover, by increasing trust amongst core nations’ mid-level security personnel, a CT CoE would 
be conducive to flattening the hierarchical and stove-piped nature of transnational trust frequently 
concentrated around the most senior personnel. In short, by targeting adaption from the bottom up, 
a CT CoE will enable the organic development of a CT network amongst trusted partners. Our CT 
CoE recommendation is therefore an adaptive change, with low organisational and political risk, and 
relatively easy to establish in terms of resources and political capital. Thus, it promotes standardisation 
and trust through regular, formal training and education. It also represents the low hanging fruit of 
transatlantic CT reform: it is the easiest to do, with large potential gains for little risk. Crucially, it 
provides an opportunity to begin reforming transatlantic CT from the bottom up.
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2. Introduction
Since the GIRI’s last report, Reforming Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism, was released in November 
2016, the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) have witnessed a further 12 major ISIL-
related terrorist attacks. These latest attacks have killed 23 and wounded at least 186 civilians. As a 
result, between May 2014 and May 2017 at least 38 serious ISIL-related attacks have occurred inside 
the EU and US, killing 365 and wounding 1,243 citizens, over 275 of whom were critically injured. 
Attacks have occurred in the European capitals of Berlin, Stockholm and London, in major cities 
such as New York, New Jersey, Hamburg and Antwerp, and in Paris Orly airport. Meanwhile, Russia 
and Turkey have also suffered further major ISIL terrorist attacks. Clearly, the ability of ISIL-inspired 
terrorists to strike inside the transatlantic space and beyond has not diminished. As our last report 
identified, these terrorists are: increasingly linked with criminal networks; quickly self-radicalising 
online; less hierarchically organised; utilising more effective counter-intelligence techniques to evade 
detection; and using adaptive tactics to conduct both sophisticated and crude attacks.1 The success 
of these recent attacks – in particular the fact that intelligence indicating their possibility were either 
not shared between nations or not prioritised – underscores the pressing requirement for improved 
counter-terrorism cooperation to respond to this constantly evolving threat. Indeed, as ISIL comes 
under increasing military pressure in Iraq and Syria, it is seeking to intensify its campaigns in the EU 
and US. Furthermore, the ongoing lack of integration of Muslim communities in both Europe and the 
US means this threat is likely to increase over time rather than diminish.2 
Reforming Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism argued that a new transatlantic security architecture is 
needed to address the rise in Salafi jihadist terrorist attacks in Europe and the US. These attacks have 
exposed major loopholes in some nations’ security architecture and highlighted that counter-terrorism 
cooperation could be more integrated at the transnational level to address the 21st century terrorist 
threat. In particular, our report proposed four solutions based on current best practices to improve 
transatlantic counter-terrorism cooperation and national capabilities. Our first proposal called for the 
establishment of a permanent Core Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Hub would provide a secure 
space for linking existing national CT centres with high degrees of mutual trust. Secondly, within this 
Hub we recommended that operational Case-Based Task Forces be established, designed to react 
to current, emerging and residual CT challenges. Thirdly, the report recommended that a so-called 
“hit no-hit” single search interface be established to enable real time information exchange between 
already existing databases. Our final recommendation was to create a transatlantic Counter-terrorism 
Centre of Excellence (CT CoE) to accelerate tactical and operational standardisation in terminology, 
threat assessment, protection of information and privacy as well as key tradecraft skills within the CT 
domain. Consisting of willing and capable nations, this CT CoE would not only increase the capacity 
and compatibility of European and transatlantic CT partners, but would also help create a much-
needed bridge between mid-level intelligence, security and law enforcement professionals on CT 
issues. Crucially, it would also help promote the social relations central to increasing organisational 
trust needed to improve transnational cooperation. 
This feasibility report builds on our previous work, taking up the mantle of the CT CoE to explore the 
benefits of such a new body/network and how it could work effectively in practice. Centres of Excellence 
are not new in the security-counter-terrorism nexus; however, those networks established either 
nationally or as a part of wider alliances, such as NATO or the EU, have not initiated a comprehensive 
program targeting the practical training of mid-level CT intelligence and law enforcement professionals. 
1 Globsec Intelligence Reform Initiative. (2016). Reforming Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism, Bratislava: Globsec, 12.
2 Interview, former national CT coordinator, 11 April 2017.
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3. Context
In order to achieve truly professional operational cooperation, discrepancies among European 
and transatlantic partners in respect to standardisation, capacity and skill must be recognised and 
addressed. The post-9/11 world amplifies these discrepancies. Recent developments within the CT 
sphere have, according to former GCHQ officer Michael Herman, emphasised ‘the importance of 
professional qualities throughout [the] whole process of collection, evaluation, assessment and 
distribution’. He adds that the importance of standards ‘spreads well beyond the English-speaking 
communities’ and that ‘the era of increased inter-governmental cooperation increases the need not 
only for intelligence exchanges, but also for professionalism in handling it.’3 Similarly, standardisation 
also contributes to defining and overseeing legal parameters for intelligence operations.4 According 
to the former Director of GCHQ, David Omand, these developments could be facilitated by more 
‘rigorous intelligence community training’ and more engagement between intelligence communities 
and outside experts.5 
Recognising that a lack of standardisation is therefore a long-standing problem, this study argues that 
the time is ripe to invest effort and resources into addressing these discrepancies by establishing a 
Centre of Excellence for willing and capable member states (MS), which would assist European and 
transatlantic partners in increasing their capacity and interoperability in a practical manner. Firstly, this 
study explores the issues of trust and social relations, which the CT CoE seeks to address. Secondly, 
it briefly assesses the current CT intelligence, security and law enforcement training and education 
architecture. Finally, we present our CT CoE proposal that addresses these shortcomings and offers 
practical, bottom-up solutions. 
3 Herman, M. (2004). ‘Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001’, ch. 12 In: Scott, L. and Jackson, P. D.  (eds.). Understanding 
Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows. London: Routledge. 187.
4 Svendsen, A.D.M. (2012). The Professionalisation of Intelligence Cooperation: Fashioning Method out of Mayhem. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 24.
5 Omand, D. (2013). ‘The cycle of intelligence’. In: Dover, R., Goodman, M.S. and Hillebrand, C. (2013). Routledge companion to intelligence 
studies. Routledge, 69.
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4. Trust and Social Relations
Further ISIL-inspired attacks against soft targets inside the transatlantic space will provide a major 
challenge for its intelligence and security architecture as currently configured. Our previous report 
highlighted numerous functional and capability gaps in this architecture, many of which, despite some 
recent improvements, remain problematic. The most important of these include professional trust 
and practical transnational cooperation between different nations’ intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies at all levels of the intelligence cycle. Recent attacks have shown that there are wide 
discrepancies between European states’ intelligence as well as law enforcement capabilities and 
capacities, and that some of the most capable nations remain reluctant to share with less capable 
nations due to well-founded scepticism about their operational capabilities and, crucially, their ability 
to prevent leaks. Similarly, there needs to be trust that if a specific piece of intelligence is passed on, 
it is not acted upon without the originator’s consent and in reference to their legal framework. Whilst 
numerous legislative and historical discrepancies between some nations further inhibit trust-building, 
it must also be recognised that some bilateral intelligence sharing relationships, and indeed core 
multilateral arrangements such as Five Eyes Plus, work very well and have very high degrees of trust 
complimented by strong organisational security cultures. On the other hand, it is also clear that the 
WikiLeaks and Snowden revelations damaged transnational trust and some bilateral relationships. 
The problem of trust also manifests itself at the domestic inter-agency level, and especially between 
law enforcement and intelligence services. In particular, the Paris and Brussels attacks of November 
2015 and March 2016 highlighted that numerous European intelligence, law enforcement, security 
and legal services have not succeeded in developing a strong sense of a communal counter-terrorism 
effort. Despite some efforts to centralise and improve sharing, some nations’ security services remain 
functionally divided, curtailed by rivalry, and reportedly under-resourced. They therefore do not share 
information with each other – or with their governments – to the same degree as more capable nations 
that have adopted the Fusion Cell/Hub model. As a result, they can struggle to share information 
rapidly in order to identify and pre-empt attacks. As many of the perpetrators of recent terrorist attacks 
had criminal backgrounds, the failure to fully incorporate law enforcement into the national CT effort 
has also left operational and tactical cooperation gaps and curtailed some nations’ ability to collect 
valuable human intelligence (HUMINT) from often marginalised communities. Without stronger trust 
between intelligence and police agencies, this is likely to continue.
4.1 Legislation
Inevitably however, some restrictions on sharing information between intelligence, security and law 
enforcement must remain in place. Sharing intelligence with law enforcement is sensitive and must 
follow strict rules and regulations in accordance with national legal safeguards, including whether 
certain intelligence can be used in court. National legislation is not the only obstacle. On a more 
fundamental level, the problem stems from the fact that intelligence starts with uncorroborated hints 
and leads. That is why intelligence services are usually denied executive power: if this ‘principle of 
suspicion’ is to be transferred to law enforcement, it must be closely regulated. Otherwise it can 
lead to flawed procedures, violation of fundamental rights, misuse of powers or eventually to a 
secret police system. This challenge also translates to international intelligence, security and law 
enforcement cooperation. According to veterans of European intelligence services, creating legally 
acceptable cooperation channels between intelligence and security networks such as the Club de 
Berne’s Counter-Terrorism Group (CdB CTG) and its law enforcement counterparts such as Europol is 
a challenge that will need to be overcome.6
4.2 Culture
Closely related to whether national intelligence agencies trust one another are the issues of capability 
and security culture. Capability discrepancies across a number of functions essential to strong CT 
6  Interview, 5 April 2017, Brussels.
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cooperation can, and are, curtailing transnational trust. Not all services are known to follow CT case 
management and prosecution best practices when handling intelligence or personal information.7 
The issue of the actual capability of intelligence operatives is also key as it determines whether 
an intelligence agency can be relied upon to conduct covert missions and collect vital intelligence 
without revealing itself and potentially damaging wider investigations. Partners’ collection capacity is 
also important: do these intelligence and law enforcement services have a broad spectrum of strong 
HUMINT, signals intelligence (SIGINT) and protected information (PROTINT) collection capabilities, or 
are they skewed to certain areas, or not up to standard across these functions? Does their analysis, 
dissemination and operational functions work effectively? Moreover, do their intelligence services 
have strong democratic oversight and do politicians hold them accountable? Does their legislation 
allow them to act on the intelligence and/or information being sent from internal/external allies? 
Similarly, and often most importantly, how strong is the security culture of the organisation receiving 
the intelligence? Is there rivalry between domestic agencies that would prevent the passage of 
information? Does an agency or agencies have a history of leaks, or are they politically too close 
to potential adversaries to warrant the risk of sharing? As such, there are numerous very practical 
considerations – which have often been learnt the hard way – that influence transnational and inter-
agency trust. 
4.3 Interpersonal Trust
It is therefore clear that trust is the fundamental foundation upon which good transnational and 
inter-agency CT cooperation is based. As one former senior CT professional admitted, ‘trust is 
based on enhanced social relations.’8 Thus, trust is an inherently social product. In counter-terrorism, 
trustworthiness is dependent on consistent and correct behaviour in past interactions, organisational 
mutual dependence and strong security cultures, but in its strongest form it is about relationships; 
the social cohesion found within and amongst organisations. The literature on social cohesion is 
informative here, as long-standing research on military groups has found it not only to be correlated with 
high degrees of trust, but also to effective group performance in high-stress situations.9 It is therefore 
clearly relevant to practical trust between mid-level intelligence and law enforcement professionals. 
Moreover, often the strongest forms of transnational trust are based on interpersonal relationships 
and social cohesion between service heads that have been forged through shared experiences, a 
history of trustworthy interactions, and common values and language. It is no coincidence that the 
Five Eyes agreement was originally based around English-speaking nations, while other highly trusted 
partner nations such as Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands, traditionally have very strong English 
competencies throughout their services. 
Further down the chain of command, especially at the domestic level, strong bonds of trust are 
created by shared experiences of operations and training, but, as we will see, this can be inhibited 
at the transnational level due to a lack of a multi-agency approach. Creating a secure space to build 
and consolidate transnational and inter-agency relationships amongst mid-level CT professionals 
is therefore central to this report’s emphasis on a CT CoE. Building this trust will be reliant on 
the relevance of the subjects covered and the quality of the instructors and attendees, but also on 
the latter’s ability to openly share experiences and discuss best practices. Only with such quality 
assurance, complimented by the interactions between mid-level intelligence and law enforcement 
officers from trusted partner nations, can a gradual increase in transnational trust from the ‘bottom up’ 
be effected.
7  Interviews, 27 March 2017, Norway; Interview, 3 April 2017, London.
8  Comments, former national CT coordinator, 12 October 2015.
9  Globsec Roundtable, Bratislava, 15 April 2016.
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5. The Need for Standardisation
Experts and practitioners alike have expressed the need to increase standardisation in counter-
terrorism. Issues with regard to standardisation have emerged in both old and new democracies. For 
instance, the UK – which today arguably represents Europe’s best example of national standardisation 
in CT intelligence practice – went through a steep learning curve as a result of Northern Irish terrorism 
and then the Al Qa’ida threat. Furthermore, analytic training was improved following the 2004 Butler 
Report on intelligence failures on Weapons of Mass Destruction that informed the decision to invade 
Iraq. Moreover, in its 2007 report on the practice of ‘renditions’, the UK’s parliamentary oversight 
body – the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) – highlighted some of the problems associated 
with a lack of standardisation; ‘Other countries have different legal systems and different standards 
of behaviour to the UK, and their intelligence and security services have varying levels of capability, 
capacity and professional standards. These factors must be taken into account when working with 
foreign liaison services.’10 
Standardisation was also an issue within US intelligence. So much so that in 2005, a report published 
by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of 
Mass Destruction – also known as the Robb Silberman Report – suggested establishing a National 
Intelligence University to implement standard terms and practices. Although various discipline-
specific intelligence training programs had been in place for decades, the Report recognised that 
there was no initial training provided to all incoming intelligence personnel that ‘instils a sense of 
community and shared mission – as occurs, for example, in all of the military services’. Furthermore, 
the Committee thought that there was also lack of adequate management training programs, which 
arguably contributed to the declining numbers of mid-level intelligence officers.11 
Since the fall of communism, some of the newer EU member states are also said to have inadequately 
trained their intelligence officers. Insufficient and unprofessional recruitment strategies, a lack of 
continuity caused by intelligence politicisation and purges of communist-era personnel, and poor 
operational planning skills which often result in improvisation have been identified.12 However, other 
Eastern European countries argue that their training is more compatible with the US and UK models 
than that of some of the older Western European democracies. This paradox is a consequence of 
NATO’s pre-accession training carried out throughout the region in the 1990s and early 2000s.13 
Overall, according to a former head of a continental European intelligence service, this variety of 
standards is also determined by their training capacities and on who intelligence agencies primarily 
recruit.14 Indeed the lack of standardisation across the transatlantic space is so great that some veteran 
intelligence practitioners have suggested an audit of the methods, terminology and level of national 
standardisation among transatlantic partners.15 
10 ‘Renditions Report’. (2007). Intelligence and Security Committee, UK. 13.
11 Iraq Intelligence Commission. (2005). ‘Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 
 Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction’. Unclassified Version, March, 31, 325-26.
12 Csipák, L. (2013). ‘Únik utajovaných informácií z prostredia spravodajských služieb’. Asociácia bývalých spravodajských dôstojníkov. 
41-2.
13 Interview with Iulian Fota, Director of National Intelligence College, 4 May 2017.
14 Interview, 5 April 2017, Brussels.
15 Interview, 27 March 2017, Norway.
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6. International Networks and Training
Since 9/11, CT has become one of the most prominent issues on the agendas of intelligence and 
security agencies worldwide. Consequently, it has become a core issue to multiple intelligence, 
security and law enforcement alliances. As a reaction to the recent wave of terror in Europe, a number 
of these alliances are being re-assessed, upgraded and operationalised to fit this new security 
environment. Indeed, a number of these international networks have introduced training or exchange 
of best practices programs into their portfolio. To understand where and how the CT CoE could bring 
value or enhance and compliment the work of already existing programs, the following section briefly 
examines their capacities to conduct joint training of mid-level CT operatives and analysts. Existing 
networks without training functions are not discussed.
Current transatlantic counter-terrorism networks can be divided into those that broadly operate on the 
strategic, operational and tactical levels. Strategic intelligence, which is concerned with security trends 
and wider emerging threats and challenges, is generally less sensitive and shared more routinely; 
operational and tactical intelligence, which looks at specific leads and cases, is more sensitive and 
thus cooperation in this domain is less frequent and much more restricted. 
6.1 Five Eyes
Arguably the most effective core transatlantic CT network, spanning both the strategic and operational 
levels, is the Five Eyes arrangement between the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Each 
of these countries – all Anglophone with common legal systems – provide different capabilities and 
geographical coverage, but the long-lasting relationship between members and their high levels 
of trust have proven conducive to the regular sharing of other types of intelligence. A number of 
more recent, subsidiary bilateral sharing agreements have reportedly been set up within the Five 
Eyes framework, such as the so-called Nine Eyes network, comprising Denmark, Norway, France, 
and the Netherlands. A wider alliance, the 14 Eyes Group – also known as SIGINT Seniors Europe 
(SSEUR) – expands this network to include Germany, Spain, Italy, Belgium, and Sweden. This alliance 
is predominantly focused on exchanging military SIGINT. However, while the Five Eyes network does 
foster close and frequent liaison, a degree of standardisation, and stronger trust between members, 
as far as we are aware this does not extend to regular and formalised joint training for mid-level CT 
officers and analysts.
Within the Five Eyes alliance, another well respected platform is the Leaders in CT (LinCT) network, 
which operates predominantly on the operational and tactical levels exclusively within the CT domain. 
It informally brings together law enforcement, intelligence services and the military from these nations 
to provide the basis for enhanced social relations and the cross fertilisation of ideas, best practices 
and experiences that build trust.16 Rotating between member states, classified meetings are held each 
year that attract senior personnel. The quality of attendees, the frank nature of discussions, and the 
strong level of trust ensure that attendance is highly desired. However, it is open to top and senior, 
not mid-level, officials only. While LinCT does conduct some training on a rotational basis for Future 
Strategic Leaders, in reality these are also senior personnel. It does not currently conduct regular, 
formal, CT training for mid-level personnel and neither is its training accredited.17
6.2 Club de Bern’s Counter-Terrorism Group
Within the European CT context, the CdB CTG is also well respected and of increasing importance. 
Established in 1971, the CdB consists of the heads of EU MS internal security services and those of 
Norway and Switzerland and it has traditionally dealt with strategic level intelligence. However, after 
9/11 it set up the CTG to specifically address Salafi jihadist terrorism, and this has led to an increasing 
emphasis on operational and tactical cooperation. In establishing the CTG, the Club de Bern aimed 
to achieve a delicate balance by which, on one hand, they helped facilitate multilateral liaison and, on 
the other, kept intelligence competence and decision-making within the remit of the MS.
16 Comments, former national CT coordinator, 12 October 2015. 
17 Interview, former national CT coordinator, 11 May 2017.
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In 2016, in reaction to the terrorist attacks in Europe, the CTG strengthened its integration and tactical 
cooperation. Under the stewardship of the Dutch domestic intelligence and security service, the AIVD, 
members of the CTG launched an operative platform for multilateral exchange of operational CT-
related information. Representatives from its MS are now meeting on a weekly basis to address some 
of the issues identified by the evolving jihadist threat. It also recently established its own database, 
the effectiveness of which is yet to be determined. In practice, however, some difficulties remain: to 
date, not all MS have appointed liaison officers to the platform; attempts at CT cooperation with some 
EU agencies, such as Europol, have had little success, with the CTG MS services giving preference 
to sharing information with their national law-enforcement bodies on a bilateral basis in accordance 
with national legislation.18 Moreover, the CTG remains focused on operational matters; it does not 
coordinate standardisation of terminology and practice nor host regular, formal, training for mid-level 
intelligence and law enforcement officers.
6.3 INTCEN
The importance of standardisation and joint training has also been recognised by INTCEN, the EU’s key 
strategic intelligence body, which also produces CT assessments and reports. Over the past decade, 
INTCEN production has moved from primarily working with open source intelligence (OSINT) and EU 
diplomatic reports, to producing fused strategic assessments based on MS civil/military, domestic and 
foreign intelligence reports, delegation reports, and OSINT. Efforts to centralise CT analysis within 
INTCEN are currently under way with plans to set up a larger CT unit. Increasing INTCEN’s capacity 
by seconding more MS personnel is also under consideration, and, overall, the trend within INTCEN 
has been to gradually move from bilateral to multilateral liaison. However, the degree of multilateral 
sharing varies considerably between MS and is determined by history and political landscape. 
Crucially, INTCEN has also invested in standardising tradecraft training. This is based on the INTCEN 
leadership’s recognition of the importance of sharing standards (terminology, analysis and collection 
methods) in CT. This training is conducted by selected MS services to encourage the exchange of 
best practices. Intelligence scholars have also been engaged in this process. Moreover, in terms of 
capacity building, INTCEN tapped into the expertise of colleagues seconded from MS and turned 
these into a best practice manual. Moreover, INTCEN had organised training on intelligence utilisation 
for consumers, which was found to be a useful exercise. Reportedly, there is great appetite from 
policymakers, in MS as well as the European Commission, for briefings on the CT situation. The only 
major constraint to developing these programs further are issues of capacity.19 Ultimately, INTCEN 
is an EU institution working with EU MS services and for the Union’s policymakers. Linking a wider 
transnational initiative such as the CT CoE, which envisions engaging nations outside the EU, with 
INTCEN would therefore not be feasible.  
6.4 EUROPOL 
Europol was launched in 1999 to predominantly facilitate joint analysis and exchange of criminal 
intelligence on organised crime between all EU MS.20 In January 2016, Europol established the 
European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC), which utilises new integrated databases and computer 
networks to store and exchange data between MS, and partners such as Interpol and Eurojust.21 
Although in the wake of the Paris and Brussels attacks Europol assisted in providing leads to the 
French and Belgian authorities, the ECTC is yet to prove its worth to MS intelligence communities, a 
number of which have been reluctant to share CT-related information via this platform as they have 
not managed to overcome the ‘nation-centric culture’, discussed above. There have been recent 
attempts to increase the ECTC’s role in the CT domain and establish cooperation with the CTG, but 
without visible progress. Some MS representatives have argued that this is very much a symptom 
of the fact that this process is driven by heads of these organisations; it is not a bottom-up, organic 
phenomenon.22  Based on available data, the Europol does not run any joint CT training programs for 
EU MS mid-level intelligence, security law enforcement and justice professionals.  
18 Interview, 5 April 2017, Brussels.
19 Interview, 5 April 2017, Brussels.
20 Interview, 17 August 2016, Brussels
21 ‘History of Eurojust’. EUROJUST. http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/about/background/Pages/History.aspx, Accessed: 6 April 2016.   
22  ‘Europol Review 2014: General Report on Europol Activities’. Europol. 
 https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/europol-review-2014, Accessed: 10 March 2016; Interview, 4 April 2017, Brussels.
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7. Existing Centres of Excellence
7.1 NATO
To date, various security or political alliances have adopted the Centre of Excellence model. For 
instance, NATO established its Centre of Excellence for Defence Against Terrorism in Ankara, Turkey, 
which serves as a hub for discussion on counter-terrorism. The Centre is said to conduct training 
and education – courses, seminars, conferences and workshops – on CT issues for NATO MS and 
partner countries, as well as cooperate with academic research. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether 
the intelligence, security and law enforcement professionals central to CT efforts are involved in these 
activities nor what skills these programs address.23 Indeed, given that NATO is a military alliance 
unable to collect data on its own populations, its real domestic utility appears rather limited. 
7.2 RAN
In 2015, the EU Commission established a Centre of Excellence within its Radicalisation Awareness 
Network (RAN). RAN was set up to target radicalisation by facilitating the exchange of expertise and 
best practices among so called ‘first line practitioners’, which include educators, social workers, local 
authorities and other actors relevant to the CT cause.24 The RAN CoE’s emergence two years ago 
suggests the increasing need for exchange of best practices and knowledge among CT professionals 
on the European continent. 
7.3 GCTF
Since 2011, the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), initiated by Turkey and the United States, 
has brought together dozens of CT professionals to promote a joint strategic approach to CT and 
radicalisation. In concert with the UN this informal platform examines: effective responses to the 
‘foreign terrorist fighters’ phenomenon; the role of the judiciary in adjudicating offenses related to 
terrorism; rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremists; and community engagement and 
community-oriented policing as tools for countering violent extremism. It runs a number of courses 
aimed at exchanging best practices on how to deal with some of these challenges.25
7.4 The US
In the US, the Department of Homeland Security has also set up two centres of excellence focused on 
counterterrorism, in both instances these are led by established academic institutions. The National 
Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE), led by the University of Southern 
California, evaluates risk perception, communication and assessment. Moreover, it also evaluates 
the costs and consequences of terrorism.26 The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START), led by the University of Maryland, provides policy makers and 
practitioners with empirically grounded findings on the human elements of the terrorist threat and 
informs decisions on how to disrupt terrorists and terrorist groups.27 
Clearly, transatlantic CT networks exist in both the intelligence and law enforcement domains. 
While these vary in respectability and effectiveness, they highlight that some of the most effective 
transnational cooperation is taking place within smaller alliances. Moreover, those involved in these 
networks are predominantly very senior intelligence personnel (service chief level). This reality shapes 
23 ‘Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism’. Coedat.nato.int,
http://www.coedat.nato.int/about.html, Accessed: 24 April 2017.
24 ‘Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)’. Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/
what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network_en, Accessed: 25 April 2017.
25 ‘Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)’. https://www.thegctf.org/About-us/Background-and-Mission, Accessed: 25 April 2017; NATO 
PA. (2016). ‘FINAL REPORT - Enhancing Euro-Atlantic Counter-terrorism Capabilities and Cooperation’. Nato-pa.int, 8-9. http://www.
nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=4320, Accessed: 25 April 2017.
26 ‘Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE)’. http://create.usc.edu/research/research-areas, Accessed: 25 
April 2017. 
27 ‘The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’. http://www.start.umd.edu/, Accessed: 25 April 2017.
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wider international and inter-organisational trust in three ways. Firstly, there is a lack of participation 
by mid-level intelligence, and especially law enforcement officers, in many of these networks thereby 
excluding them from developing trust-based relationships until much later in their careers. This limits 
wider inter-organisational trust, especially when compounded by well-founded traditional counter-
intelligence security cultures that often foster suspicion amongst the most able mid-level intelligence 
officers. Secondly, law enforcement CT networks are generally weaker than those in intelligence, 
despite the fact that policing is increasingly crucial to CT efforts. Finally, none of these networks 
are providing regular, formalised training to their members, and decisively, to mid-level officers, 
thereby failing to capitalise on their successes by regularly educating their best intelligence and law 
enforcement officers together to gradually build trust. In short, an opportunity to reform transatlantic 
counter-terrorism cooperation from the ground up is being missed.
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8. National CT Training and Education Centres
On the national level, an increasing number of European states have introduced intelligence education 
and training institutions. The following section highlights some examples of countries, namely Norway, 
Romania and the Scotland, with institutions that run two-tier intelligence training and education: 
tradecraft-focused programs for entry level intelligence officers and wider educational courses for 
mid-level/senior officers aimed at increasing their general knowledge of intelligence and its relevance 
to politics and strategy. Discussions with representatives of these institutions suggest that there is 
considerable interest to share best practices in the CT tradecraft field internationally, which would 
encourage trust and standardisation at the international level.
8.1 Scotland
Scotland’s recent experience of CT transformation is highly informative due to its implementation 
of standardisation and training in a multi-agency environment. It centralised eight regional police 
forces and two agencies in April 2013 in the new Police Scotland organisation and established a 
Scottish Crime Campus (SCC) outside Glasgow. In terms of CT policing, there was a requirement to 
ensure national standards of both operational and professional competence were being adopted and 
applied: 10 versions of the truth had to be fused together in order to create coherent and coordinated 
CT responses.
The underlying approach to standardisation and training was to promote a culture and behaviours that 
would epitomise the new organisation and deliver both internal and external trust in competencies. 
Effective governance was identified as key to this and as such, in the CT domain, CTOLD – Counter-
Terrorism Organisational Learning and Development – was established. This was supported by the 
creation of a skills matrix to define what skills were needed in particular roles; what was the standard 
of training required in each role, and how such training would be delivered. This resulted in the 
matrix identifying every role required, the professional and personal competencies required, and the 
appropriate accreditation. Interestingly, this skills-based analysis resulted in the introduction of inputs 
at the CT recruitment stage to support organisational cultural change from the bottom up.28 
Basic training was delivered at the Scottish Police College and at UK facilities to ensure that 
interoperability, governance, standards and tradecraft were comparable. This training also enhanced 
social relations and built inter-agency trust. The training extended beyond rank and file to involve 
Counter-Terrorism Senior Investigating Officer training, and at the mid-level, Counter-Terrorism Police 
Operations Room manager training, Intelligence Manager training and analyst training. There was a 
‘golden thread’ in all training courses to ensure a single version of the CT intelligence picture was 
formed, underpinned by standardised terminology and practices. This training was then expanded into 
a multi-agency context – law enforcement, military and intelligence partners engaged in table-top and 
live play exercises-  and then further training to ensure interoperability and the understanding of roles 
and responsibilities. This enhanced trust and confidence through the mutual exchange of information. 
In terms of CT, a single intelligence data platform was also introduced requiring multi-agency training 
to ensure common language, common standards, and common tradecraft in intelligence handling. 
This included law enforcement and intelligence services, UK Border Force, military, fire service, 
the National Domestic Extremism and Disorder Intelligence Unit, Civil Nuclear, and customs and 
immigration agencies.
When gaps in operational competency are identified through CT operational debriefs, they are 
referred to CTOLD who then allocate ownership with leads in training, policy, and legislation to ensure 
the lessons learned are incorporated into future training and education. This process continues by 
fusing assets from academia, third and private sector. If CTOLD identifies a gap in learning requiring 
academic input, a university can be approached to carry out appropriate research. This process has 
already benefited academia with rich data and law enforcement with rich thinking that can then be 
operationalised on completion. In addition, those officers and staff with a particular aptitude for further 
education are sponsored by a university to undertake a PhD in areas of operational importance.
28 Comments, former CT professional, 10 May 2017.
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This fusion of learning and education led to the creation of multi-agency governance groups and the 
delivery of Police Scotland CT training with multi-agency assets. The result has been safer, stronger 
communities; a flexible and agile multi-agency CT workforce with the confidence and trust in one 
another to enhance information exchange, and the coordinated sharing of assets resulting in a greater 
level of actionable intelligence.  The multi-agency training has now extended upwards within the 
organisation with senior commanders regularly participating in joint exercises and, more importantly, 
strengthening their relationships thereby making it easier to exchange information ahead of a critical 
incident.
Overall, the creation of the SCC delivered organisational change, created stronger governance 
mechanisms, national standardisation, improved relationships and enhanced trust. It has resulted in 
the right people with the right skills being deployed at the right time against the threats, which allows 
for appropriate resource allocation against the demand profile. Due to its success, the SCC has grown 
to include 19 national agencies, and is internationally recognised as a Centre of Excellence. 
8.2 Norway
A frequently cited example of national level best practice in intelligence and CT training and education 
is the Norwegian Defence Intelligence University College. The mission of the centralised, multi-
agency University, which belongs to the Norwegian Foreign Intelligence Service (NIS), is to ‘serve and 
build the intelligence community through research, teaching and doubt.’29 Building on its academic 
expertise, it has adopted an overarching cognitive approach to both teaching and research. As a 
result, understanding and assessing validity and reliability in the intelligence process are fundamental 
to the University’s teaching.
In terms of education, the University delivers two, three-year Bachelor of Arts (BA) degrees in 
intelligence. The first degree is part time and is designed for mid-level intelligence officers, analysts, 
decision makers and, importantly, consumers. This accredited educational course aimed at mid-
level practitioners is especially relevant to a potential CT CoE in terms of how it could deliver wider 
educational benefits. The students come from the foreign and domestic intelligence services, as 
well as the wider intelligence community, including Special Forces. The objective of the course is 
to give students the opportunity to reflect more broadly on their trade as their careers progress. As 
such, it fuses academic and professional knowledge of intelligence through the combination of both. 
Course modules include judicial and legislation issues; intelligence history; functional approaches 
to intelligence; structural approaches to intelligence; decision-maker support; and intelligence 
leadership. The course is designed to allow these mid-level producers and consumers of intelligence 
to refresh their skills and thereby bring decision makers and the services closer together. 
In line with other national intelligence and CT institutions, the University also runs a BA in Intelligence 
and Languages for entry-level officers and numerous tradecraft and analysis courses at the more 
senior second and third levels. Other major European nations have praised the University’s ability to 
centralise multi-agency intelligence and CT intelligence training in one location whilst at the same time 
fusing academic and practitioner best practice. Whilst it must be recognised that because Norway’s 
intelligence service and its military intelligence are controlled by the Ministry of Defence this fusion is 
somewhat easier, and that the relatively small size of Norway’s intelligence/CT community is another 
factor, it is highly regarded both domestically and at the international level.
8.3 Romania 
The intelligence education model promoted by the Romanian Intelligence Service via its ‘Mihai 
Viteazul’ National Intelligence Academy (MVNIA) represents one of the most advanced of its kind in 
the former communist countries of South Eastern Europe. The Academy, established in 1992, delivers 
a variety of widely-respected educational programs; BA, MA, and advanced vocational training. 
Of most relevance to the CT CoE proposal are the Academy’s BA level courses dedicated to the future 
officers of the SRI, the Romanian Domestic Intelligence Service. These cadets can either develop their 
analytic skills by enrolling in the Security and Intelligence Studies program, or become case officers 
and enrol in the Psychology – Intelligence program. Courses include logic and argumentation theory 
29 Interview, 27 March 2017, Norway.
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(critical thinking), information security management, human behaviour optimisation techniques, foreign 
languages and strategic influence operations, applied informatics in intelligence activity. Future case 
officers undergo training in psychology: the psychological assessment of the individual and the group, 
training in networking, motivation and interpersonal communication. 
Of further interest are the Academy’s mid-career programs, run by the National Intelligence College, 
which provide post-graduate education to a wide variety of mid-level from military, intelligence and 
law enforcement professionals, to relevant government civil servants to consolidate their strategic 
decision making skills. The three-month long course represents a mandatory qualification for a 
number of such strategic positions. Finally, the Academy also runs an MA program in the Prevention 
and Countering of Terrorism. Although this program is likely to attract some mid-level practitioners 
from intelligence, security and law enforcement, senior management at the Academy would like to 
see further international cooperation and training within this realm.30 
The number of formal accredited national intelligence and security education programs is rising 
in other countries too. In 2011, the US formally established the National Intelligence University by 
expanding the mission of the National Defense Intelligence College. It provides training and education 
programs from entry level to advanced job-skills, sets curriculum standards, and facilitates the sharing 
of the intelligence community’s training resources.31 Most recently, Germany began setting up a 
Master’s Course in Intelligence and Security Studies at the Federal German University of Applied 
Administrative Sciences. Although these programs’ focus on CT issues varies from nation to nation, 
this suggests there is growing interest in formalised intelligence and security education across the 
transatlantic space. 
30 ‘“Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy’. http://animv.ro/en/despre-noi/, Accessed: 25 April 2017; Interview with Iulian Fota, 
Director of National Intelligence College, 4 May 2017.
31 Iraq Intelligence Commission. (2005). ‘Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction’. Unclassified Version, March, 31, 325-26.
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9. Towards a Transatlantic CT Centre of Excellence 
The surge in training and educational programs shows that there is a recognised requirement of 
the benefits increased standardisation and professionalisation can bring, at the domestic and 
transnational levels. In line with this requirement, our CT CoE proposal aims to contribute in a number 
of ways. Most crucially, it seeks to create a secure space where CT professionals can discuss best 
practices. Complimenting this, it aims to accelerate standardisation in terminology, threat assessment, 
protection of information as well as key tradecraft skills: collection, analysis, and dissemination within 
CT. 
As noted, intelligence cooperation is characterised by a high degree of informality and driven by 
personal relationships.32 The proposed CT CoE is not an attempt to change this informal culture. 
Nevertheless, its establishment is based on the realisation that a critical majority of partners relevant 
to CT efforts in Europe must work together using common standards and a common understanding of 
what their intelligence, security, law enforcement and justice communities can and cannot deliver. On a 
voluntary basis and in cooperation with partners – states, international institutions, academia and even 
NGOs – the CT CoE would be a platform where best practices are exchanged, syllabuses and training 
material shared, and relevant courses introduced. With its foundations in a shared perception of threat, 
and supported by strong political will, the CT CoE’s primary goal would be to promote standardisation 
and build trust and mutual understanding. The added value of joint standardisation and training, which 
the CoE would design and run, would rest in bringing primarily mid-level intelligence, security and 
law enforcement professionals together around CT issues to increase trust among participants, and 
thereby gradually expand the trust in and between their organisations. Once established, the CT CoE 
could work in concert or informally coordinate with other relevant bodies such as LinCT, the CdB CTG 
and the growing number of educational institutions devoted to intelligence and security education. 
It is clear that as well as a requirement for better standardisation, joint transnational tradecraft training 
of mid-level CT officers could gradually build capabilities from the bottom up amongst trusted partners. 
Indeed, during our research, officials indicated that LinCT is interested in developing a CT CoE based 
around its existing network. Given this potential synergy, and acknowledging GIRI’s independence and 
impartiality, below we present the main proposals for such a body that may prove useful in providing 
the basis for further consideration for nations.
9.1 CT CoE Framework 
The first question that must be addressed is which existing transnational CT network currently has the 
expertise, trust, capability and respect to host such a new body? While we recognise that for the rapid 
sharing of operational CT intelligence a core of nations with high degrees of trust, interoperability and 
capability are needed to ensure secrecy, we believe that for any CoE to add any real value it must 
include a larger group of nations from the outset. Simultaneously, it must ensure that the utility of the 
training and education delivered remains collectively beneficial. Given these requirements, LinCT or 
the CdB’s CTG could be the organisation/s within which the CT CoE is initially based. According to 
some of our interviews, LinCT’s close links to the Fives Eyes provides it with the reputation needed 
to ensure that the training offered is both respected and readily attended by the EU and US CT 
communities. This reputation extends to non-Five Eyes trusted partners, some of whom already view 
LinCT meetings as the most desirable and useful to attend due to the frank discussions of best practice. 
While it is clear that the LinCT is highly respected amongst some European nations, its membership is 
limited, and for the CT CoE to add real value in terms of common terminology, standards and practices 
it needs a wider membership in order to uniformly raise capabilities. As such, ideally, the CT CoE 
will include LinCT and CTG members and both organisations could jointly provide the organisational 
support or host different programs and courses run under the CT CoE framework. In adopting a 
joint overarching organisational approach, the CT CoE would become as much a mind set for best 
practice as a formal training and education centre. Indeed, linking with our Core Transatlantic CT 
Hub proposal, mandatory membership of the CT CoE for these members would help ensure security 
culture standards, while the CT CoE could also assess prospective new members of the Hub.
32 Globsec Intelligence Reform Initiative, (2016) Reforming Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism, Bratislava: Globsec, 15.
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Another major question is whether the CT CoE should initially be led by a framework nation within 
LinCT/CTG. Our research revealed a general perception amongst CT professionals with experience 
of past attempts at transnational CT training that those with a designated framework nation are most 
successful. This is due to the international trust and reputation associated with a respected nation 
taking ownership for the project, in liaison with other members. It also shows that a major nation 
is politically invested in the project for the long run, demonstrating that this nation values it both in 
operational and political terms and is willing to financially support it. As one CT professional stated, for 
the CT CoE to succeed, ‘it needs true value and positive outcomes. It must be extremely convincing’.33 
As such, within the LinCT/CTG network, potentially nations such as the UK or the Netherlands could 
take initial ownership of the CT CoE, establishing the syllabi and identifying course locations needed 
in conjunction with other members. Funding will be an issue, but can be mitigated by the rotation of 
framework nation every five years or more.  
With a framework nation designated within the LinCT/CTG host network, once standardisation and 
course syllabi have been agreed upon, if desirable, different member states could host different 
modules. For example, the UK could host a weeklong module; Norway, Germany, Romania and the 
Netherlands could host others. Such rotation would help spread the administrative and financial 
burden, but will only be effective if each module remains truly useful. Openness and operational utility 
must provide the basis for what is delivered in each module.
The Scottish, Norwegian and Romanian examples are interesting as they highlight how academic 
rigour can be combined with professional expertise to enhance learning and hence capacities. While 
it will be for any framework nation to decide how to accredit the course, accreditation would act as 
an enticement for mid-level CT professionals to attend and boost the respectability of the course. In 
the UK for example, numerous well-respected educational institutions such as Kings’ College London, 
and Warwick and Cranfield Universities have strong links with the intelligence and security services 
and could potentially accredit the courses and contribute to the syllabi in places of operational utility. 
Given that the CT CoE could perhaps run four or five week-long modules a year, depending on 
academic course work and assessment, it is feasible that the level awarded could be a Graduate 
Certificate or Diploma. Each nation would be expected to send two of their best mid-level CT officers 
from both the intelligence and law enforcement communities in order to ensure frank discussions, and 
gradually build trust. 
9.2 CT CoE Operational Focus
The CT CoE would primarily drive standardisation at the tactical and operational levels, by encouraging 
standardisation of terminology, threat assessment, protection of information and privacy as well as 
key tradecraft skills. This operational level cooperation is critical to the CT CoE: according to Michael 
Herman, the value of CT intelligence is primarily in its ‘nitty-gritty tactical use’.34 Others have argued 
that in CT intelligence, more than any other area, tactical data has strategic impact.35 Recognising 
the considerable discrepancies between European and transatlantic partners, the raison d’etre of 
the CT CoE is to get into the ‘nitty-gritty’ of intelligence and create an environment – both in terms of 
culture as well as content/training – that enables exchange and harmonisation in a number of areas: 
terminology, collection, analysis and dissemination.
9.3 Terminology
According to Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, terminology is crucial as it is ‘determinative of what, in 
the end, is considered to be the ‘knowledge’ upon which policy may be based or by which it is 
rationalised.’ For instance, the subtle differences that intelligence agencies might use to differentiate 
between different levels of confidence in the intelligence they possess (i.e. ‘intelligences shows’ vs. 
‘intelligence indicates’), might escape busy or ‘untutored’ decision makers. The problem with using 
non-standardised language in assessments was highlighted in the Butler Report, which stated that 
33 Interview, 27 March 2017, Norway.
34 Herman, 2004, 186.
35 Builta, J.A. and Heller, E.N. (2011). ‘Reflections on 10 Years of Counterterrorism Analysis’. Institutionalizing Best Practices. Studies in 
Intelligence, Vol. 55, No. 3, 2.
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there was no ‘glossary’ to define and distinguish between terms such as ‘we assess that’, ‘we judge 
that’, ‘we believe that’.36 This meant that confidence in assessments varied and while this has since 
been rectified in the UK, such easily solvable issues continue in other states. For example, without a 
common definition ‘probable causes’, ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘moderate confidence’ may mean 
different things to different CT agencies. 
Another relatively simple problem to solve is that of the common formatting of intelligence reports, 
with information presented in different ways and locations often leading to confusion during routine 
information and intelligence sharing. Similarly, there is a pressing need to agree upon standardised 
translations of Arabic names. One of the central goals of the CT CoE would be to act as the focal point 
for the standardisation of agreed terms for assessment meanings, common language and translation, 
and formatting. In addressing these relatively solvable issues, the CoE would act as the beacon for the 
increased operationalisation of information exchange through commonality.
9.4 Collection
Collection, or more precisely the art of accessing intelligence about CT suspects, remains the most 
difficult area to exchange best practices in as it is highly sensitive and capabilities vary considerably 
between nations. One important area that the CT CoE should focus on is the introduction of basic 
tradecraft best practices to raise operational collection capabilities. On the other hand, it must be 
recognised that major discrepancies in some collection functions will remain. For instance, due to 
the US’ presence in Afghanistan, Iraq and other parts of the Middle East, its CT analysts have been 
able to utilise intelligence recovered from documents and detainees. Access to such materials has 
provided the US with both tactical as well as strategic CT intelligence, but such methods have also 
proved controversial at times.37 Arguably, European partners’ access to such data is more limited, or 
highly dependent on liaison with Middle Eastern governments or the US. For a number of European 
nations, whose homeland is the area of operations, they may benefit from exchanging best practices 
with US colleagues. Nevertheless, understanding best practices in alternative ways of accessing data 
on terror groups in Europe would be of value to European CT practitioners. 
Indeed, one area where a CT CoE could add value is in helping develop a common understanding 
of when targeted collection is needed. Building on common language and assessments, this could 
increase the efficiency of collection in some nations and help manage limited resources. This wider 
setting of the criteria for collection can also be applied to the processes of analysis and dissemination. 
Similarly, the standardisation of data points for collected information and intelligence is also badly 
needed. While we recognise that existing national database formats may curtail some CT CoE 
members from implementing full standardisation, the CoE would be the body that agrees on these 
standards and provides consultation on standardised database formatting.  
9.5 Analysis
The surge in terrorism since 9/11 has dramatically changed analysis requirements.38 Some have argued, 
however, that this change was more about the pace rather than the nature of analysis.39 Two different 
types of analysis are required within this context; immediate actions to support tactical operations and 
strategic analysis to understand international events. The Butler Report, which recommended a number 
of improvements in British intelligence analysis and Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessments, 
also highlighted this by suggesting staff increases and the establishment of a Professional Head 
of Intelligence Analysis to advise on methodologies and training. It is highly significant that in the 
wake of the Butler Report, the British intelligence services, in conjunction with King’s College London, 
have introduced advanced accredited courses specifically for analysts to understand the cognitive/
36 Gill, P. and Phythian, M. (2012). Intelligence in an insecure world. Cambridge: Polity Press, 116-7.
37 Builta and Heller, 2011, 5.
38 Treverton, G. F. and Gabbard, C. B. (2008). Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR293.html, Accessed: 20 April 2017.
39 Marrin, S. (2013). ‘Evaluating CIA’s Analytic Performance: Reflections of a Former Analyst’. Orbis, 57, 327-8.
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functional, historical, structural and political factors that can influence their analysis.40 In 2005, the 
Robb Silberman Report, also called for improving the rigor and tradecraft of analysis. 
Furthermore, the nature of CT targets calls for increased cooperation between analysts and experts 
outside of the immediate intelligence and security community, be it geographical, functional or 
language experts.41 
9.6 Dissemination
As the process of producing intelligence analysis is not linear, the analyst interacts with users of 
intelligence at different stages of the process and in different ways in what are often referred to 
as ‘analytic interactions’.42 A number of classic intelligence-policymaker dissemination models exist, 
such as ‘intelligence brokers’ or ‘customer liaison staffs’, who help interpret policy needs and guide 
analysts.43 These dissemination processes influence how analysis is distributed and received by 
relevant figures in the government. Within the CT context, however, analysts must cater to a number 
of different users of intelligence, be it policymakers, law enforcement, collectors, military operators or 
counterparts. This calls not only for an in-depth understanding of the role of these diverse users, but 
also of CT-specific decision cycles and intelligence requirements of each one of these actors.44
Another important dissemination issue the US experienced has been that of the ‘threshold’ for 
revealing the identity of a person of interest based upon the threat they pose. This is a result of the 
legal need to protect information and intelligence until a certain level of threat is reached. Differing 
privacy laws among CoE member states may limit this in some instances, but agreed common threat 
terminology will be conducive to developing criteria for revealing suspect identities based on the 
threat they pose.  
9.7 Curriculum
Primarily, the CT CoE should be a secure space where CT intelligence and law enforcement 
professionals in the European and transatlantic space can share best practice and experiences. 
Recognising that mid-level CT practitioners are best placed to determine exact course curricula, the 
following topics are suggested as possible areas to be addressed by the CT CoE.
 ■ Terminology (setting standards and guidelines for translators from mostly ME languages) 
and Threat assessment 
 ■ CT collection methods. To include: target discovery analysis spotting patterns and 
understanding target behaviors
 ■ CT investigations/case management using intelligence
 ■ All source CT analysis 
 ■ Area/ subject studies
 ■ Technology
 ■ Programming 
 ■ Advising intelligence consumers
 ■ Legal compliance and privacy
40 Goodman M., and Omand, D. (2008). ‘What Analysts Need to Understand: The King’s Intelligence Studies Program,’ Studies in 
Intelligence, Vol. 52, No. 4.
41 Builta and Heller, 2011, 8.
42 George, R. Z., and Bruce, J. B. (2014). Analyzing intelligence: origins, obstacles, and innovations. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 4.
43 Omand, 2013, 69-70.
44 Builta and Heller, 2011, 8.
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Overall, at the transnational level, the closest intelligence networks share common methods and 
terminology. This report recognises that adopting such common standards is a long-term process that 
requires a common political and intelligence culture. Furthermore, it acknowledges that it is neither 
possible nor desirable to dictate the standards of the intelligence, security and law enforcement 
profession to partner countries. Nevertheless, as discrepancies between states do exist, it is important 
to understand them and to create a platform for exchanging and potentially adopting practices from 
different intelligence and security cultures that address the current terrorist threat best.
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10. Conclusion
Our CT CoE proposal addresses the wider organisational context of how intelligence agencies and 
security services innovate and adapt to meet new challenges. Interestingly, how intelligence agencies 
organisationally transform to face new threats has received limited attention to date, especially outside 
of the US. There is, however, a long-standing tradition of scholarship on military transformations. While 
the differences between the intelligence services and the military must be accepted – especially how 
the need for secrecy can deepen reluctance to change and justify resistance to external criticism 
– in many respects the military transformation literature is applicable to CT agencies. Broadly 
speaking, successful transformations have been conceptualised as occurring through two distinct 
processes: ‘top-down’ innovation driven by visionary elites; and ‘bottom-up’ adaption whereby those 
organisationally closest to the threat evolve to mitigate it.45 Most importantly for this report, it has been 
identified how successful transformations have simultaneously included top-down innovation and 
bottom-up adaption. Indeed, these dual processes have been found to be central to lasting, prevalent 
organisational change.46 Interestingly, the most recent scholarship has found that successful military 
transformations must also reflect the societies from which they are drawn.47 
Whatever the differences between intelligence and military organisations, given the evolving jihadist 
threat these concepts of transformation remain important to current debates about intelligence reform. 
If intelligence agencies do not continuously innovate and adapt to meet the increasingly transnational, 
criminal and technologically-savvy terrorists of today, the attacks of the past three years will continue. 
Moreover, by increasing trust amongst core nations’ mid-level security personnel, a CT CoE would 
be conducive to flattening the hierarchical and stove-piped nature of transnational trust frequently 
concentrated around the most senior personnel. In doing so, this could gradually assist hierarchical 
intelligence and law enforcement services reflect wider changes in society, whose old hierarchies are 
widely perceived to be flattening. In short, by targeting adaption from the bottom up, a CT CoE will 
enable the organic development of a CT network amongst trusted partners.     
It is clear therefore that in an ideal situation intelligence reform would simultaneously include top-
down innovation and bottom-up adaption. Our previous report’s recommendations for a Core CT Hub 
and Task Forces, and for single search ‘hit no-hit’ database interfaces are innovations in that they will 
require politicians, senior policy makers, and in some cases legislators to implement these changes. 
While we recognise that these are major reforms not without political and organisational risks, we 
believe that if managed correctly these risks are worth the reward. However, multilateral multi-agency 
education through a Core CT CoE presents an opportunity to create common standards and language 
to strengthen collective capability and interoperability. It will also gradually build transatlantic and inter-
agency trust in intelligence and law enforcement from the bottom-up. Our CT CoE recommendation is 
therefore an adaptive change, with low organisational and political risk, and relatively easy to establish 
in terms of resources and political capital. Thus, promoting standardisation and building trust through 
regular, formal training and education, and represents the low hanging fruit of transatlantic CT reform: 
it is the easiest to do, with large potential gains for little risk. Crucially, it provides an opportunity to 
begin reforming transatlantic CT from the bottom up.
Authors’ note:
While conducting research for this feasibility study, dozens of academics, practitioners, and 
policymakers, both former and current, were consulted and kindly provided helpful insights and 
guidance. The study also benefited from a number of site visits at institutions which conduct or assist 
with intelligence education, training or liaison. Due to the sensitive nature of this subject, the majority 
of our sources have requested to remain anonymous. 
45 Posen, B. (1984). The Sources of Military Doctrine. New York: Cornell University Press; Grissom, A. (2006). ‘The Future of Military 
Innovation Studies’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 29(5), 910.
46 Foley, R., Griffin, S. and McCartney, H. (2011). ‘”Transformation in Contact”: learning the lessons of modern war’, International Affairs, 
87(2), 253.
47 Bury, P. (2016). The Transformation of the British Army Reserve, unpublished thesis, University of Exeter.
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